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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE

G-2 COMMENTS ON WORKING DRAFT OF SE-47: PROBABLE EFFECTS
OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY ON SOVIET POLICY
WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

*ARMY Declass/Release
Instructions On File*

1. Page 1, par 1, line 4. Change to read:

"On 10 June the Soviet-occupation-authority SED Central Committee
of the Eastern Zone of Germany announced recommended a series of measures
involving major modifications and, in some cases, even reversals of past
Communist policies. On 26 June, It was The GDR Council of Ministers
announced reiterated that the government would ..."

2. Page 2, par 1, line 6. Change to read:

"... crimes; and issue ration cards to some 250,000 East Germans
who had previously been denied them; provide more food and consumer goods;
recalculate wages in relation to work norms; provide better housing; ease
crop quotas; and decrease allocation of resources to industrialization and to
the military in favor of agriculture and consumer goods. On the same day..."

3. Page 2, par 2. Change to read: "The 26 June ..."

4. Page 3, line 1. Change to read:

"~~As of 20 June~~ Sporadic outbreaks still continued continue.
The Soviet authorities depended almost exclusively on the use of Soviet units
troops in the areas of violent disorder, and did not withdraw begin withdrawing
these troops until 24 June, when order was apparently restored."

5. Page 3, par 4b. Change to read:

"The occurrence of such extensive disorders, and the The decision to
employ primarily Soviet troops to quell the disorders
~~which the disorders they were handled,~~ revealed Soviet distrust the inadequacy
of the East German regimes police, armed forces, and security apparatus forces,
The decision to employ primarily Soviet forces troops in preference to East
German forces to quell the disorders almost certainly reflected a desire to use the
most reliable and efficient troops available. Soviet concern over the reliability
of East German military units."

6. Page 3, par 4b, line 7. Add the following sentence:

"... German military units. Soviet forces acted with great restraint,
resulting in better feeling towards them than towards the East German forces."

Document was
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass

☐ It contains information of CIA

Interest that must remain

classified at TS

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

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7. Page 4, par 4e, line 7. Delete last sentence:

"On-the-other-hand ... Germany-for-free-elections."

8. Page 4, par 4f. Change to read:

"A workers' revolt against the authorities of a "workers state" is in itself a major propaganda defeat setback for the international Communist movement.

9. Page 5, par 5. Change to read:

"The Communist authorities in East Germany have announced that the concessions of 19 June 26 June will not only be carried through, but will be amplified. However, it is likely that only those measures which are consistent with the requirements of local economy and internal security will be implemented. It is unlikely, for example, that the Communists will be willing to follow through on their 10 June invitation to repatriate without prejudice those Germans who fled East Germany."

10. Page 5, par 6. Add following par after par 6:

...aspects of a "loyal opposition."

For the time being, the ^{Khrushchev} ~~Communists~~ will place no great reliance on the KVP. ^{Since the visit} ~~Some~~ East German leaders ^{have} promised ~~that the KVP would be reduced and~~ that some funds allocated for the KVP would be diverted to finance programs to raise the standard of living of East Germany. There are no confirmed indications that these promises pertaining to the KVP reduction are thus far being carried out"

11. Page 5, par 6, line 8. Delete following portion:

"If non-SED representatives are given posts in the government, they will probably be put in consequential positions."

12. Page 5, par 6, line 3. Change to read:

"...though as yet there are no firm indications of such developments..."

13. Page 7, par 7, line 8. Change to read:

"...their chance to influence favorably West Germans. We believe There are no indications that the USSR will probably attempt to continue abandon a moderate policy in East Germany and will employ overt force only if all other measures fail."

14. Page 6, par 8a, 1st sentence. Change to read:

"a. To prearrange initiate ^{and} ~~the~~ negotiations..."

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14. Page 7, par 8b. Change to read:

"b. To agree on the creation of a unified armed, neutral Germany with a small national armed force, on the basis of ..."

15. Page 7, par 10. Delete first sentence; change second sentence to read:

"The Kremlin may have come to the conclusion that a solution of the German problem according to course of action 'b' cannot longer be postponed, and that considerable some advantages might be derived from such a solution. ..."

16. Page 8, par 10. Change to read:

"...between the US and its allies. Finally, ~~the Kremlin might be confident of its ability ultimately to subvert a neutralized Germany. The~~ uprisings in East Germany, however, very probably have increased the Kremlin's doubt that a neutralized Germany could be prevented from assuming a strong pro-Western orientation. Furthermore, the effect of adopting course of action 'b' would probably place the Soviet and satellite relations in such jeopardy that the Soviets may decide against adopting this course of action.

17. Page 8, par 11. Delete entire paragraph.

18. Page 8, par 12, line 3. Change to read:

"...We further believe that Soviet courses of action with respect to the unification of Germany will be the same whether the conference were called for by either the USSR or the West."